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THE POLITICS OF FEMALE IDENTITY: 
AN INTERVIEW WITH JANE SHERR0N DE HART
Jane E. Simonsen
This interview took place on September 26, 1996 while Jane De Hart visited 
the University of Iowa as an Ida Beam Distinguished Visiting Professor. Cur­
rently at the University of California at Santa Barbara, De Hart’s work 
includes77ie Federal Theatre, 1935-39: Plays, Relief, and Politics ( 2nd ed., 
1971), Sex, Gender, and the Politics o f ERA: A State and the Nation (1990), and 
the co-editorship of four editions of the women’s history text Women’s America: 
Refocusing the Past (4th ed., 1995). While in Iowa City, De Hart presented 
two lectures, “Containment at Home: Boundaries and the Body Politic” and 
“Exclusion from Home: Black Welfare Mothers as ‘Other,’” based on her cur­
rent research on national identity in Cold War America. She also presented the 
keynote address, “Suffragists’ Hopes/Feminists’ Strategies: Women and Elec­
toral Politics” at the University of Iowa conference “The Uses of Suffrage: 
Women, Politics, and Social Change Since 1920.” Here she discusses some of 
the ways race and gender identities and constructions of difference have influ­
enced and been influenced by federal politics and policy.
Your work in both Sex, Gender, and the ERA and in your forthcoming book on 
the politics o f national identity reveal ways in which race and gender 
overlap.'This overlap was evident in the preliminary chapter o f Sex, Gender, 
and the ERA, which dealt with suffrage, and in the more recent struggle over 
ERA. It was also prominent in your lecture on contemporary welfare politics 
and the racialization ofAFDC mothers. What first alerted you to the role o f 
race in the debate over ERA ?
One of the advantages of working on very recent history is the opportunity to 
be a participant observer. When I began research on the ERA ratification struggle 
in 1977,1 attended the legislative hearings at which supporters and opponents 
testified for and against ratification with the plea, “Please don’t desexigrate 
us.” 2 Of course, the word isn’t in the dictionary, but I thought it was quite 
revealing because it so clearly linked this woman’s concerns about federal gov-
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emment policies associated with racial desegregation and her apprehensions 
about future measures relating to sex-based discrimination. Another telling 
example was a letter to U.S. Senator Sam Ervin, written when ERA was still 
being debated in the Senate, that consisted of one sentence: “Forced busing, 
forced mixing, forced housing. Now forced women! No thank you!” 3 These 
women (and many men) were thoroughly convinced that an interventionist gov­
ernment that would force the integration of residentially segregated housing, 
public facilities, dictate whom businesses could hire through affirmative ac­
tion, and “destroy” neighborhood schools by busing simply could not be trusted. 
My initial inclination was to think these concerns were distinctively Southern - 
the old states’ rights stuff - until I saw the same arguments voiced in Massachu­
setts in debates over passage of a state ERA.
This notion o f ‘ forced women ” suggests another concern o f ERA opponents: 
fears that an equal rights amendment would make them “become men. ” Many 
of us think o f liberal ERA activists, most o f whom were feminists, as basing 
their politics on womanhood. Yet the conservative anti-ERA women you de­
scribe in your book are also basing their politics on a concept o f womanhood, 
although a different one. In some ways ratificationists never took this into ac­
count. They assumed that passage o f ERA would produce gender neutrality in 
the law. Opponents foresaw something much bigger - cultural revolution. Why 
weren’t ERA supporters more perceptive about opponents’ apprehensions? If  
they had been, could they have countered them more effectively?
How to neutralize the opposition’s apprehensions is a critical question that sup­
porters of state ERAs in Iowa and elsewhere must surely be asking themselves. 
You are right. Different conceptions of womanhood are involved because the 
two groups attach different measures of significance to female difference. 
Ratificationists were liberal feminists for the most part. Like radical feminists, 
they tended to minimize female difference, believing that men and women were 
more alike than different and should be treated the same, except when biologi­
cal difference really mattered. Antiratificationists/antifeminists, like many “dif­
ference” feminists, maximized and valorized female difference. Anti-ERA 
women also had difficulty separating sex and gender. They saw gender neutral 
law not as stripping away the cultural meanings attached to sexual difference 
that penalized women; rather, gender neutrality meant denying them the privi­
leges and protections of womanhood. It meant denying them the right to be 
women and forcing them to “become men.” As an attack on their very identity, 
gender neutrality was perceived as the basic obliteration of self.
I’m not sure whether it would have been possible for ratificationists to ad­
dress these fears even if they had understood them. What supporters heard from 
opponents were their fearful projections of the dire consequences of ratifica­
tion: loss of exemptions from military service if a draft were reinstated (on that 
point supporters agreed), loss of other legal privileges, sexual integration of 
public restrooms, decriminalization of rape, legitimization of homosexuality, 
further entrenchment of abortion as an option, destruction of the family, and so
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on. Supporters were appalled at the exaggeration and misinformation in these 
charges and tried to respond. But answering the charges “logically” and “factu­
ally” never addressed the core concerns of opponent women.
The sense o f women’s vulnerability is palpable in the consequences they project 
onto ERA legislation. They fear that because o f their sex they will be more 
vulnerable to rape and abuse, especially in the workplace or in the military.
Absolutely. The military represents the greatest danger. But they also feel vul­
nerable in the workplace. Equality has historically meant “equality of oppor­
tunity” to Americans - equal opportunity to compete economically. What femi­
nists saw as broadening of opportunities and options, antifeminists saw differ­
ently. They were keenly aware that as women they lacked the socialization and 
possibly the skills that would make them effective competitors in the work­
place. Feminists, whom antifeminist thought were aggressive and relished com­
petition, were not only perceived to be behaving like men, but were “becom­
ing” men. In doing so, they were setting a standard to which all women would 
have to conform - and in places that were potentially dangerous to women.
Separation o f space by gender - this goes back to deeply rooted ideas that women 
work in the home and men in the public realm. I find it interesting that, al­
though many antiratificationist women were already working outside the home, 
in some way the loss o f the idea o f separate spheres seems disadvantageous to 
them. I'm struck not only by how closely our conception o f equality is tied to 
work, but also to our conception o f citizenship. You touched on work and citi­
zenship in your lecture on welfare mothers.
Judith Shklar’s wonderful little book, American Citizenship, makes the point 
that although the constitution says nothing about earning in relation to citizen­
ship, Americans have always linked the two.4 Earning provides the indepen­
dence and public respect that have historically entitled one to full and equal 
citizenship. I think this emphasis on earning helps to explain why Americans 
have had greater difficulty than Europeans in embracing the concept of social 
citizenship - the right of all citizens to a basic level of economic security and 
welfare - not welfare in the sense of charity or relief, but in the larger sense of 
that term.
It's ironic that welfare has become such a pejorative term, since much o f the 
early welfare legislation was designed to protect women and children and to 
maintain families. Yet we now have this picture o f the welfare mother as a single 
mother with children born out o f wedlock; it is at odds with the traditional ideal 
o f family which those laws were designed to protect. How did this fictive iden­
tity o f the welfare mother develop?
That requires a much more complex and nuanced explanation than we have 
time for. The place to start is with the fact that we have always discriminated 
between the “worthy poor” and the “unworthy poor” where some form of pub-
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lie assistance is concerned. When Mothers’ Pensions were inaugurated in the 
early years of the 20th century, the goal was to assist “worthy” mothers with 
dependent children. That meant for the most part widows who were morally 
upright: who were not cohabiting with men who were not their husbands and 
who did not have illegitimate children. The women whom local administrators 
determined met that criteria were overwhelmingly white and judged to be “good” 
mothers by middle-class standards. As Mothers’ Pensions eventually evolved 
into Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC], these rules remained in 
effect. Welfare was intended not only to provide an economic safety net but to 
send messages to the poor as well as to the larger public about dominant norms 
with respect to work and family. Concerns about frugality and morality re­
quired that welfare rolls remain small. Racist and gendered assumptions about 
work and family ensured they be kept white. As a result, needy women of color 
were disproportionately relegated to the ranks of the unworthy until the 1960s.
The civil rights movement, the welfare rights movement, War on Poverty, 
and the Supreme Court changed all of that. As welfare and other poverty pro­
grams became accessible to women of color, their numbers increased. So did 
the number of whites on welfare, for that matter. The problem was that, by the 
1970s, when the backlash against the “excesses” of the 1960s set in, black ille­
gitimacy, unemployment, crime, and welfare continued to rise. And don’t for­
get the riots. Many whites felt that the very people who were rioting were ben­
eficiaries of their hard-earned tax dollars. Federal largess, race, and moral break­
down became impossible to disentangle. In this climate, the stereotype of the 
black welfare mother unwilling to work or to wed was a wonderful weapon that 
old-line conservatives as well as neoconservatives could use to discredit 
Johnson’s social programs and, of course, welfare itself - which the public had 
come to equate with AFDC. As a symbol, the black welfare mother encapsu­
lated a number of disturbing developments: prolonged welfare dependency, 
rising illegitimacy, increasing numbers of female-headed households. Matri­
mony, paternal responsibility, and the work ethic all seemed to be at risk.
Does the culture o f poverty thesis relate to this stereotype ? Does this emphasis 
on deviant behavior have consequences?
The pathologizing of the poor generally and of the black matriarch in particular 
did indeed contribute to the stereotype and it certainly has had consequences. 
When Oscar Lewis’s culture of poverty thesis was first debated in the 1960s, 
critics charged that, in trying to explain the inter-generational behavior of the 
poor, Lewis shifted the emphasis from poverty to culture and, in doing so, de­
flected emphasis from the structural causes of poverty to the deviant behavior 
of the poor. Liberals - and I would include Daniel Moynihan in that group in the 
1960s when the Moynihan Report was published - would argue that the deviant 
behavior was all the more reason for compensatory programs for the black poor 
that would break the cycle of poverty and the deviant behavior associated with 
it. But neoconservatives and old-line racial conservatives were able to use it for
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their own purposes - to support the status quo.
If you look at Congressional debates over welfare reform since the failure of 
Nixon’s family assistance plan, you will discover a real shift in emphasis. There 
is less and less discussion of how to deal with the structural causes of poverty - 
that would require additional spending - and more focus on changing the devi­
ant behavior of the poor. This shift has become quite apparent in the welfare 
debates of the ‘90s. We will use policy to change behavior: Workfare to rein­
force the work ethic, family caps to cut down on illegitimacy by cutting off aid 
to children bom out of wedlock to mothers on welfare. We will enforce parental 
responsibility by going after dead-beat dads. While we can all agree that the old 
welfare system needed reform and that the work ethic and parental responsibil­
ity are to be encouraged, these “remedies,” many social scientists argue, are 
really symbolic rather than substantive. How can you enforce child support 
when fathers are unemployed and there are simply no jobs in the inner city or 
impoverished rural areas? How can family caps work when studies show no 
evidence that women on welfare are having babies in order to increase their 
welfare checks?
In focusing on the stereotype of the black welfare matriarch, one of the things 
that I am exploring is the extent to which she has come to symbolize not only 
the AFDC mother (never mind that most AFDC mothers are white) but, inas­
much as AFDC has come to symbolize welfare, the poor generally. To the ex­
tent that she does symbolize the poor, they have become racialized and morally 
stigmatized. This further diminishes their claim on the state for assistance.
In Sex, Gender, and the Politics of ERA, you relied very much on interviews. 
We heard voices o f women from both sides; it was almost as if you were recre­
ating the conversation between them. What was so enlightening was that the 
book made real the concerns o f both supporters and opponents, particularly 
the fears o f opponent women. In the debates over welfare, the voices we hear 
are those o f politicians and policy makers, not the women on welfare who seem 
to remain voiceless. Do you intend to interview welfare mothers?
I would love to do some interviews and incorporate women’s voices into the 
welfare chapter. They may not be aware of many of the issues we have talked 
about, but they do feel that they have no voice and some do have a real sense of 
their own delegitimization and powerlessness. That perception is an accurate 
one. Many of the institutions and programs that were created during the War on 
Poverty to enhance their voices no longer exist - legal services, for example.
I have to add that interviews - we did over 100 in the ERA study - can be very 
time-consuming and sometimes very difficult to set up. Interviewing anti-ERA 
women proved enormously challenging for a number of reasons I discussed in 
an article in The Journal o f American History.5 I’d like to think that in spite of 
opponents’ distrust, we make the case for them consistent with their own posi­
tion and in ways that illuminate their real concerns.
A lot o f graduate students have concerns that what we are doing at universities
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is not going to change society. I f  we do a study on welfare mothers, for ex­
ample, what impact might it have on policy? How do we convince people that 
stereotypes, while embodying some measure o f truth, have negative and very 
real consequences for women and their families? How do you say to a politi­
cian, “Look, much o f what you are doing is symbolic and does not deal with the 
structural causes o f poverty?”
You have identified an enormous source of frustration not only for graduate 
students, but for all of us. The research assistant who was doing research for 
this chapter started out as an economic historian with a somewhat conservative 
bent. He believed the cuts Reagan was making in various domestic programs 
were a useful approach to reducing the deficit and were not “political.” After a 
summer of gathering data, which included Congressional debates on welfare 
reform for the past two decades, he walked in one day and said, “I think I’ve 
had an epiphany!” His views on Reagan and welfare had changed dramatically. 
His current concern is how to write history that policy makers will read and that 
will make a difference. The memory of policy makers is so short and often 
inaccurate that we really need good histories. Unfortunately, in the political 
climate of recent years, it is harder to have that sense of possibility that one’s 
research can make a real difference.
Your own article, “Equality Challenged,” is an example o f work that ties into 
what is going on today. 6 You tried to expose some o f the complexities o f dealing 
with sexual difference in the law in areas such as pregnancy and how to figure 
this in terms o f equality and difference.
The difference dilemma is an old and vexing problem. In the first wave of 
feminist litigation on sex discrimination, feminist legal strategists, notably Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, who was then a young professor at Columbia University Law 
School, proceeded on the assumption that equality could be achieved through 
the same treatment of both sexes. It was assumptions about gender differences 
that accounted for much of that discrimination in the first place. But feminist 
legal scholars and strategists soon discovered that the problem was more com­
plex. How to treat pregnant workers provides a perfect example. Is equality 
achieved by treating men and women workers the same, making pregnancy- 
related disability no different from any other disability? The answer seemed to 
be yes.
But what if you are an employee of a small company that has no disability 
programs for its workers and you become pregnant and it is a difficult preg­
nancy and there are complications? Taking time off may cost you your job. 
Even if you are later reemployed by the same company, you may have lost 
seniority and/or benefits. Aware that this is a real problem for many women, the 
California legislature stipulated that companies that had no disability policy 
must provide pregnancy disability for its female employees. Is this special treat­
ment for women? Yes, and male employees objected. The case, California Fed­
eral Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, eventually made its way to the
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Supreme Court. Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion which upheld 
the California law. The state of California, in treating women differently, was 
not providing special favors. Rather, he argued, it was simply trying to make it 
possible for women to have a family and also have a job in the same way that 
men have always been able to have both. As legal scholar Martha Minow would 
say, the Court tried to take into account “the difference that difference makes.”7 
Feminist legal scholars really wrestled with the difference dilemma and have 
tried to reconceptualize it. Their work has made it clear that achieving equality 
based on rights theory is a much more complex and problematic task than it 
seemed to be in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s.
There seem to be a lot o f layers to negotiate with respect to equality.
Absolutely. Feminist scholars of color have done an immense service by mak­
ing us aware of how multiple forms of oppression interact and of the magnitude 
of the changes that must occur. In my own work, I’m beginning to explore how 
hierarchies of gender, race, and sexuality resist change by virtue of their 
embeddedness in constructions of national identity. It’s a different focus for me 
and a terribly exciting one. The Ida Beam lectures have provided a wonderful 
opportunity to work through some of the issues with others before my ideas 
have really jelled. I have gotten such useful feedback from graduate students as 
well as faculty. You have some impressive students here who really know how 
to make the scholarly enterprise a collective one.
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